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SCIRICA, Circuit Judge 
 
 Lamont LaPrade appeals from the denial of his motion seeking habeas corpus 
relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 because of an Alleyne error when he was convicted for 
using or carrying a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence in violation of 18 
U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) but sentenced for a separate crime, discharging a firearm during 
and in relation to a crime of violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(iii), which 
carries a higher mandatory minimum sentence by five years.  We will grant LaPrade 
habeas relief and remand for re-sentencing to correct the Alleyne error. 
I. 
A. 
 LaPrade and David Mathis, a co-defendant, committed an armed robbery of 
Westmoreland Community Federal Credit Union on January 8, 2010.  While Mathis 
entered the bank, shot the teller using a Glock 9 millimeter handgun, and forced other 
tellers at gunpoint to empty cash from the drawers and vault into a bag, LaPrade waited 
outside in the driver’s seat of their getaway vehicle, a green Land Rover.  Once he had 
the money—around $6,878—Mathis entered the passenger seat of the Land Rover.  But 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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when LaPrade attempted to speed out of the parking lot in the getaway car, a prospective 
bank customer drove into the parking lot, inadvertently blocking their escape route.  
Mathis leaned out of the car and fired a shot toward the driver.  The driver of the 
incoming vehicle ducked and heard two more shots fired, although she did not see who 
fired the other two shots.   
 LaPrade and Mathis fled the scene via a different exit from the parking lot, but 
both men were arrested by police shortly after the armed robbery and attempted escape.  
Law enforcement officers recovered three spent casings in the parking lot: two 9 
millimeter casings and one .45 caliber casing.  Although police did not find the .45 
caliber handgun, LaPrade admitted to police he was carrying that gun and discharged it 
during the escape from the bank parking lot.  He also admitted Mathis possessed and 
fired the 9 millimeter handgun.  Police officers discovered a partially full box of .45 
caliber ammunition in LaPrade’s residence.     
 Whether LaPrade discharged the firearm is not contested in this habeas 
proceeding, and his attorney admitted in briefing and at oral argument that LaPrade 
discharged the gun.  Appellant Br. at 8.  
 LaPrade was charged with four counts of criminal conduct: bank robbery in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) (Count 1); armed bank robbery, 18 U.S.C. § 2113(d) 
(Count 2); conspiracy to commit robbery and armed robbery, 18 U.S.C. § 371 (Count 3); 
and using and carrying a firearm during a crime of violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
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§ 924(c)(1)(A)(iii) (Count 6)1. 
 LaPrade represented himself at trial and was convicted by a jury on all counts.  
The District Court instructed the jury that in order to return a guilty verdict with respect 
to Count 6, they needed to find the government proved only two elements beyond a 
reasonable doubt:  “That the defendant committed the crime of violence charged in Count 
Two of the indictment, that is, armed bank robbery.  And two, that the defendant during 
and in relation to that offense used or carried a firearm or knowingly possessed a firearm 
in furtherance of that same offense.”  App. 472.  The District Court further clarified 
“[t]he government is not required to show that the defendant actually displayed or fired 
the weapon.”  App. 473.  And in keeping with these instructions, the jury verdict slip 
described Count 6 as “[u]sing, carrying and possessing a firearm in furtherance of a crime 
of violence.”  App. 32.  The jury never made a finding that LaPrade actually discharged 
the gun, or even brandished it.   
 The District Court sentenced LaPrade to 190 months in prison.  This sentence 
included a mandatory minimum sentence of 10 years (120 months) for Count 6.2 
                                              
1 In the indictment, Count 6 described the offense as “us[ing] and carry[ing] a firearm . . . 
during and in relation to a crime of violence,” which corresponds to 18 U.S.C. § 
924(c)(1)(A), not (c)(1)(A)(iii).  But, despite the description of the offense, the 
indictment listed the statutory provision violated as 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(iii), which 
is the aggravated offense for “discharg[ing]” a firearm during and in relation to a crime of 
violence.  At trial, the District Court provided jury instructions on the base offense of 
using and carrying, and the jury found him guilty of that crime (the base crime).  But the 
District Court sentenced him for the separate crime of discharging a weapon, the most 
aggravated version of the crime.   
2 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) “imposes differing mandatory minimum sentences depending 
upon whether the defendant ‘uses or carries,’ ‘brandishe[s],’ or ‘discharge[s]’ a firearm 




 LaPrade appealed his conviction, contending certain statements made to police 
regarding his possession and discharge should have been suppressed, that evidence of his 
gun use was insufficient to support Count 6, and that his due process rights were violated 
when he wore an orange jumpsuit at his trial.  We rejected these contentions and affirmed 
his conviction on January 22, 2013.  United States v. Laprade, 511 F. App’x 181 (3d Cir. 
2013).  At no point during trial or on direct appeal did LaPrade challenge the sufficiency 
of the indictment or the jury instructions with respect to Count 6; nor did he challenge his 
sentence.  We denied LaPrade’s request for rehearing en banc.   
 Within LaPrade’s ninety day timeframe to petition the Supreme Court for a writ of 
certiorari, the Supreme Court decided Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013).  
Alleyne overruled Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545 (2002), and held that “if a 
defendant is convicted of using or carrying a firearm during and in relation to a crime of 
violence, but is instead sentenced for brandishing a firearm, the defendant’s Sixth 
Amendment right to be tried by a jury for the crime of brandishing a firearm has been 
violated.”  United States v. Lewis, 802 F.3d 449, 454 (3d Cir. 2015) (en banc) (citing 
Alleyne, 133 S. Ct. at 2163–64).  The Supreme Court clarified that 18 U.S.C. 
§ 924(c)(1)(A) (using or carrying), (A)(ii) (brandishing) and (A)(iii) (discharging) are all 
“separate, aggravated offense[s] that must be found by the jury” beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  Alleyne, 133 S. Ct. at 2162 (“When a finding of fact alters the legally prescribed 
                                                                                                                                                  
Lewis, 802 F.3d 449, 452 (3d Cir. 2015) (en banc).  The mandatory minimum sentences 
are five years, seven years, and ten years, respectively, depending on how the defendant 
was convicted of using the firearm.  18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A). 
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punishment so as to aggravate it, the fact necessarily forms a constituent part of a new 
offense and must be submitted to the jury.”).  This holding extends beyond 
§ 924(c)(1)(A): “an Alleyne error occurs when a judge, rather than a jury, finds a fact that 
increases the mandatory minimum for a defendant” because there is a “fundamental right 
of a criminal defendant to have the jury, not the judge, find such facts.”  Lewis, 802 F.3d 
at 454.   
 LaPrade did not file a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court.  Instead, 
LaPrade filed a pro se habeas petition with the District Court under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 
seeking to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence, based in part on Alleyne.  The 
government opposed this motion, contending in part that LaPrade procedurally defaulted 
on his Alleyne claim because LaPrade failed to object to the charge or sentencing at trial 
or on direct appeal.  The District Court denied LaPrade’s habeas petition, but granted him 
a certificate of appealability.  LaPrade timely appealed.3   
II.4 
 LaPrade challenges only his sentence—not his conviction—and asks us to remand 
for a new sentence.  Because LaPrade did not object to his sentence at trial or on direct 
appeal, his claim of Alleyne error is procedurally defaulted and LaPrade must 
                                              
3 As discussed at footnote 11 infra, there were irregularities with the indictment and the 
jury instructions, in addition to the Alleyne error.  But we consider only the Alleyne error 
because LaPrade seeks habeas relief solely on the basis of this error.  
4 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241 and 2255.  We have 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 2253, and 2255. 
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demonstrate why this default should be excused.5  United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 
167–68 (1982).  “[T]o obtain collateral relief based on trial errors to which no 
contemporaneous objection was made, a convicted defendant must show both (1) ‘cause’ 
excusing his double procedural default, and (2) ‘actual prejudice’ resulting from the 
errors of which he complains.” Id.   
A. 
 “To establish ‘cause’ for procedural default, a defendant must show that ‘some 
objective factor external to the defense impeded [his] efforts to raise the claim.’”  United 
States v. Pelullo, 399 F.3d 197, 223 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 
467, 493 (1991)).  There is no “precise content” to the term “cause,” nor is there “a 
comprehensive catalog of the circumstances that would justify a finding of cause.”  Reed 
v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 13 (1984); Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 534 (1986).  LaPrade 
contends he can establish cause because he had no basis to object to the sentence for 
Count 6 under Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545 (2002), which was the controlling 
                                              
5 Although we held “Alleyne cannot be applied retroactively to cases on collateral 
review[,]” United States v. Winkelman, 746 F.3d 134, 136 (3d Cir. 2014), LaPrade is able 
to seek relief by asserting an Alleyne violation because his case was not yet final when 
Alleyne was decided.  Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 321–22 (1987) (“[R]etroactivity 
analysis for convictions that have become final must be different from the analysis for 
convictions that are not final at the time the new decision is issued.”).  In other words, 
there are no retroactivity concerns preventing habeas relief on the basis of Alleyne 
because “a new rule for the conduct of criminal prosecutions is to be applied retroactively 
to all cases, state or federal, pending on direct review or not yet final, with no exception 
for cases in which the new rule constitutes a ‘clear break’ with the past.”  Id. at 328.  
LaPrade’s case was not yet final because his time to file a petition for certiorari with the 
Supreme Court had not expired.  Id. at 321 n.6 (“By ‘final,’ we mean a case in which a 
judgment of conviction has been rendered, the availability of appeal exhausted, and the 
time for a petition for certiorari elapsed or a petition for certiorari finally denied.”).      
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law at the time of his trial and sentencing.6     
 We believe LaPrade is able to establish cause.  “[W]here a constitutional claim is 
so novel that its legal basis is not reasonably available to counsel, a defendant has cause 
for his failure to raise the claim” at trial or on direct review.  Reed, 468 U.S. at 16.  “By 
definition . . . there will almost certainly have been no reasonable basis upon which an 
attorney previously could have urged . . . the position that this Court has ultimately 
adopted” when the Supreme Court “explicitly overrule[s] one of [its] precedents.”  Id. at 
17.  Here, Alleyne explicitly overruled Harris.  133 S. Ct. at 2163.  While we note that a 
claim is “not a novel one” when “the Federal Reporters [are] replete with cases involving 
[similar] challenges,” Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 622 (1998), we do not see a 
plethora of similar claims in the Federal Reporters, and the government has not pointed 
us to any such cases. 7  We agree that LaPrade had “no reasonable basis” to challenge his 
sentence under prevailing law at the time of his trial and sentencing.8        
B. 
 LaPrade must also show that he suffered “actual prejudice” by demonstrating that 
                                              
6 Harris held “as a matter of statutory interpretation, § 924(c)(1)(A) defines a single 
offense.  The statute regards brandishing and discharging as sentencing factors to be 
found by the judge, not offense elements to be found by the jury.”  536 U.S. at 556.   
7 Lewis is a lone exception.  In Lewis, the defendant was convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. 
§ 924(c)(1)(A) (using or carrying a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence), 
but following accepted practice under Harris, was sentenced for brandishing a firearm 
under § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii). 802 F.3d at 452.  Despite the fact that Alleyne was not yet 
decided, the defendant in Lewis timely objected to his sentence.  Id.  
8 The fact that the Supreme Court’s Alleyne opinion expressly overruled a prior decision 
makes the cause analysis in this case different from the analysis in cases based on 
Apprendi errors.  As we have previously noted, Apprendi did not overrule Supreme Court 
precedent and “the foundation for Apprendi was laid years before the decision was 
announced.” United States v. Jenkins, 333 F.3d 151, 155 (3d Cir. 2003). 
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the District Court’s sentencing error “worked to his actual and substantial 
disadvantage[.]”  Frady, 456 U.S. at 170.   
 The government concedes the District Court committed an Alleyne violation by 
sentencing LaPrade for discharging a weapon under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(iii), when 
the jury only convicted LaPrade of the base offense of using or carrying a firearm under 
18 U.S.C § 924(c)(1)(A).  Applying the Frady standard, we believe the Alleyne error was 
prejudicial because it resulted in LaPrade being subject to a mandatory minimum 
sentence of ten years for Count 6, instead of a mandatory minimum of five years—the 
sentence corresponding to the jury's actual verdict.  As the Supreme Court has noted, 
“[e]levating the low-end of a sentencing range heightens the loss of liberty associated 
with the crime[.]”  Alleyne, 133 S. Ct. at 2161.  And we have previously rejected the 
argument that the difference in mandatory minimums between “using or carrying” a 
firearm and the aggravated offenses under § 924(c)(1)(A) “would have made no 
difference to the sentence[.]”  See Lewis, 802 F.3d at 458.9 
 We reject the government’s contention in this case that the Alleyne error could not 
have been prejudicial because the evidence LaPrade discharged a gun was overwhelming 
and essentially uncontroverted.  As we did in Lewis, we decline the government’s 
invitation to look back at the trial record.  In rejecting that approach, we said 
                                              
9 We are mindful that Lewis was decided on direct review under a harmless error 
standard.  Nonetheless, our analysis of the effect of mandatory minimums—in which we 
concluded the “error . . . ‘contribute[d] to the [sentence] obtained,’” 802 F.3d at 456 
(quoting Sochor v. Florida, 504 U.S. 527, 539 (1992) (in turn quoting Chapman v. 
California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967)))—is illustrative on prejudice, and LaPrade carries his 
burden even under the higher actual prejudice standard.   
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Looking back to the trial record would run directly contrary to the essence 
of Apprendi and Alleyne.  The motivating principle behind Apprendi and 
Alleyne is that judges must not decide facts that change the mandatory 
maximum or minimum; juries must do so.  If we affirm because the 
evidence is overwhelming, then we are performing the very task that 
Apprendi and Alleyne instruct judges not to perform. 
 
Id. at 456 (citing Alleyne, 133 S. Ct. at 2155, 2162; Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490).  The 
same principle applies here.   
 The government’s citation to United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625 (2002), in 
asking us to consider the evidence established at trial that LaPrade discharged the gun, is 
likewise unavailing.  Cotton held an Apprendi error did not “seriously affect the fairness, 
integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings” because the “evidence [of 
guilt] . . . was ‘overwhelming’ and ‘essentially uncontroverted.’”  Id. at 632–33 (quoting 
Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 470 (1997)).  The Court in Cotton thus looked to 
the evidence established at trial to determine the effect of the Apprendi error, but it did so 
on plain error review under the “fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial 
proceedings” prong of that test.  Id.  It expressly did not decide whether the Apprendi 
error “affect[ed] substantial rights,” a test which is akin to review for prejudice.  Id. at 
632; United States v. Dobson, 419 F.3d 231, 239 (3d Cir. 2005) (“In order to ‘affect 
substantial rights,’ an error must have been prejudicial.”); United States v. Adams, 252 
F.3d 276, 285 (3d Cir. 2001) (“Normally, in order for an error to ‘affect substantial 
rights’ . . ., the error must have been ‘prejudicial[.]’”).  When reviewing for prejudice, at 
least in cases involving sentencing error and not trial error, we do not assess the “fairness, 
integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings,” and consequently we do not look 
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at the evidence at trial.10  This principle, which we have applied in the harmless error 
context, is equally applicable here.  Accordingly, we decline to look at the evidence at 
trial in determining whether the Alleyne error was prejudicial to LaPrade. 
 Because it is undisputed that the Alleyne error resulted in LaPrade being subject to 
a higher mandatory minimum sentence than he would have been subject to had he been 
sentenced corresponding to the jury’s verdict, we conclude LaPrade carries his burden to 
show actual prejudice resulting from the error.11      
III. 
 Because LaPrade has shown cause and prejudice to overcome procedural default, 
we now consider the merits of his claim.  Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1320 (2012) 
                                              
10 See Lewis, 802 F.3d at 457; United States v. Jordan, 291 F.3d 1091, 1096 n.7 (9th Cir. 
2002) (“[T]he fairness and integrity prong is inapplicable to . . . harmless error review.”); 
see also United States v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438, 450 (1986) (“we are not required to review 
records to evaluate a harmless-error claim, and do so sparingly” (quoting United States v. 
Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 510 (1983))).   
11 Beyond the Alleyne sentencing error, there were irregularities in LaPrade’s prosecution 
and in the District Court proceedings.  The indictment was flawed because although it 
recited the statute LaPrade was charged with violating, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(iii), it 
failed to list the elements of Count 6 (specifically the discharge of the firearm).  See Fed. 
R. Crim. P. 7(c)(1) (“The indictment . . . must be a plain, concise, and definite written 
statement of the essential facts constituting the offense charged.”).  Further, we believe 
the jury instruction was erroneous because it charged them to find whether LaPrade 
violated 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A), the base offense of using or possessing a firearm, even 
though LaPrade was indicted in Count 6 for the most aggravated offense of discharging a 
firearm, § 924(c)(1)(A)(iii).  In addition, the instruction erroneously instructed the jury 
that it was irrelevant whether LaPrade discharged the firearm.  App. 473.  Despite these 
apparent errors and irregularities, which could affect the classification of this case as one 
involving pure sentencing error, or a mix of trial and sentencing errors, see Lewis, 802 
F.3d at 455, the parties only discuss the Alleyne error in this habeas petition.  Further, 
LaPrade does not ask for a new trial but requests re-sentencing solely to correct the 
Alleyne violation.  Accordingly, we will not consider the effect of any of these errors 
beyond the Alleyne violation.    
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(“A finding of cause and prejudice . . . allows a federal court to consider the merits of a 
claim that otherwise would have been procedurally defaulted.”).  Although the 
government does not argue that there was no Alleyne violation, it does argue that 
LaPrade’s unpreserved Alleyne argument does not rise to the level of warranting relief 
under the plain error standard.   
 The government’s argument fails because, having cleared the cause and prejudice 
hurdle applicable to procedurally defaulted claims, LaPrade need not also clear the plain 
error hurdle.  See Frady, 456 U.S. at 163–64 (“[T]he plain error standard is out of place 
when a prisoner launches a collateral attack against a criminal conviction.”); Pelullo, 399 
F.3d at 221 (same).  Cause and prejudice analysis and plain error review serve equivalent 
purposes—when satisfied, they forgive a defendant’s failure to raise his claim at an 
appropriate time, with plain error review forgiving the failure to raise a claim at trial, and 
cause and prejudice analysis forgiving the failure to raise it before his conviction became 
final.  Because LaPrade has shown cause and prejudice sufficient to excuse his failure to 
raise an Alleyne objection before his conviction became final—a standard the Supreme 
Court has emphasized is “a significantly higher hurdle” than plain error review, see 
Frady, 456 U.S. at 166—we proceed to consider the merits of the Alleyne claim without 
requiring the redundant step of excusing his failure to raise the objection at trial or 
sentencing. 
 The government does not contest that LaPrade was sentenced under the mandatory 
minimum applicable to discharging a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(iii), even 
though the jury only convicted him of the base offense of using or carrying a firearm 
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under 18 U.S.C § 924(c)(1)(A).  This was an obvious Alleyne error.  As is evident in our 
analysis under the actual prejudice prong of the cause and prejudice analysis, the District 
Court’s error was not harmless because it resulted in LaPrade being subject to a higher 
mandatory minimum sentence than had he been sentenced according to the jury’s verdict.  
LaPrade has established a meritorious claim, and we will grant his habeas petition under 
28 U.S.C. §2255. 
IV. 
For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse the District Court’s judgment denying 
LaPrade’s § 2225 motion, and remand to the District Court with instructions to grant the 
motion and resentence LaPrade in accordance with this opinion and in consideration of 
18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) and the Sentencing Guidelines. 
